Applying §6.1.4 (air ORBAT) and §6.1.5 (kill web): Kaskilva's air defense is not a loose set of systems but a networked whole.
| Component | Role |
|---|---|
| Central GCI fusion node | Combines all sensor pictures, distributes targets across the SAM batteries |
| Long-range radar (×2) | Feeds the fusion node; mutually redundant |
| SAM batteries (HIMEZ/LOMEZ, several) | Can engage on their own radar or on an external cue from the fusion node |
| Fighter regiment | Vectored by GCI, can itself also act as a sensor |
Taking out one SAM battery leaves the network largely intact — another battery covers the sector via a cue from the fusion node. The central GCI fusion node, by contrast, is the node that, if it drops out, throws every battery back onto its own, isolated radar — exactly the "silent SAM" advantage the defender then loses. That makes the fusion node the primary HVT, not the most expensive or most visible platform.
Intelligence gaps at this point: how much redundancy does the fusion layer itself have (one node or two)? And how fast can the SAM batteries fall back to autonomous radar operation if the network goes down? These are the PIRs that drive collection planning for Step 4.