Applying §5.1.3 and §5.1.4: instead of OAKOC, you build a combined threat overlay of Kaskilva's air defenses.
| Layer | Characteristic in this case |
|---|---|
| HIMEZ | Long-range SAM (SA-10-class) — coverage ring of roughly 150 km, spans the entire corridor |
| LOMEZ | Medium-range SAM (SA-8/Buk-class) — 35–40 km, concentrated around the two main airfields |
| SHORADEZ | Point defense around the GCI node and the primary airfield |
| Gap | A narrow corridor low over the sea along the northern edge, where the HIMEZ ring just fails to reach the coastline |
Use the engagement zone widget in §5.1.4 to visualize this yourself: turn on HIMEZ and LOMEZ and show that the "gap" only exists at low altitude, right under the HIMEZ radar horizon — and disappears the moment Kaskilva could run a JEZ that lets the zones overlap.
The Baltic winter brings a low cloud ceiling and periods of moderate icing — this constrains both the attacker (minimum altitudes for CAS) and the defender (EO identification becomes harder, straining the JEZ combat-ID prerequisite). A planned operation accounts for that window.
Output of Step 2: a combined threat overlay identifying one candidate corridor — low, along the northern edge, time-bound to the weather — as the starting point for the threat analysis in Step 3.